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JONES v. HULTON: THREE CONFLICTING JUDICIAL
VIEWS AS TO A QUESTION OF DEFAMATION.
The difference of opinion among the judges of the Court
of Appeal in Jones v. E. Hulton & Co., L. R. (1909), 2 K. B.
444, is a matter of great importance; not so much because of the
specific question there directly in issue, though that is by no means
insignificant, but because of the grounds upon which they differed.
Lord Alverstone, C. J., and Moulton, L. J., took diametrically
opposite views as to first principles; as to the fundamental doctrine underlying an action for defamation.' And the third judge,
Farwell, L. J., in giving his reasons for concurring in the result
reached by Lord Alverstone, took what may be called a middle
ground, which is believed to be untenable. A like difference of
opinion is found in the comments of legal periodicals. Thus the
minority opinion of Moulton, L. J., was emphatically approved in
25 Law Quarterly Review, 341. On the other hand, Lord Alverstone's view is adopted in 23 Harvard Law Review, 218; while
the decision of the majority in favor of the plaintiff is criticized
in 58 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 166-169.
But the difference of opinion does not stop here. The case
was carried to the House of Lords. 2 The four Law Lords who
'In the comments on this decision in 35 Law Magazine and Review, 5th
Series, p. 104, the writer sdys as to libel "

. .

. it is amazing to find that the

law affecting it is still floundering in elementary definition."
Hulton

.

"Jones v.

. is the illustration."

'L. R. (igIo), Appeal Cases, 20.
(365)
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sat in the case agreed in affirming the judgment rendered in the
Court of Appeal. But two out of the four, while professedly
concurring in the opinion delivered by Lord Chancellor Loreburn, expressed their special adoption of the reasoning of Farwell, L. J., in the Court of Appeal. It would seem that the
positions of the judges in the. two courts may be fairly summarized as follows:
Ili favor of the general view taken in behalf of the plaintiff:
Lord Alverstone, C. J., Lord Chancellor Loreburn and Lord
Shaw.
In favor of the general view taken in behalf of the defendant: Moulton, L. J.
In favor of a middle view (which seems untenable): Farwell, L. J., Lord Atkinson, Lord. Gorell.
The first and most obvious question is: Which of these
conflicting views is correct?
But of equal, or even greater, importance is the inquiry:
How does it happen that such a fundamental question can be
regarded as open to discussion at this late day? If one side or
the other is wholly in the wrong, how does it happen that eminent jurists can be laboring under such a fundamental mistake?
Is it due to several causes, viz.: (I) the astonishing vitality of
legal fictions; (2) the unnecessary, but customary, retention in
the declaration of an allegation contained in the old forms; (3)
the use of certain ambiguous words capable of being understood
in different senses by different users?
It is now proposed:
To consider the meaning of some ambiguous words;
To give a very brief outline of the history of the law of
defamation, so far as it bears on the question in Jones v. Hulton.
To state the case of Jones v. Hulton, and analyze the various
opinions.
To consider two questions: (i) Which of the conflicting
views is correct; and (2) a matter of the greatest importance,
how to account for the fact that some eminent jurists can now
be laboring under a fundamental mistake as to the very gist of
the action for defamation.
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As to the meaning of the expressions, "intent," "motive"
and "malice."
Intent is used in various senses. One use of the word is
to denote the volition, the exercise of will power, requisite to
constitute a muscular movement an act; i. e., to constitute the
movement of a man's muscles the act of that man. Intent, in
this sense, is always requisite to an action for defamation. 3 To
hold a defendant for libel, you must always show that the writing was his act. To constitute an act there must be a volitional
movement of the muscles. If defendant's hand was irresistibly
guided by a more powerful man, or if the motion of his hand was
due to a convulsive spasm while he was undergoing an epileptic
fit, then the writing was not his act. There was no exercise of
his will in the moving of the hand. In most actions for defamation there is no doubt as to the presence of intent in this signification; and there was no dispute on this point in Jones v. Hulton.
But the word intent is frequently used to denote, not an
intent to do an act, but an intent that an act shall produce certain
consequences; not an intent to publish a statement, but an intent
that certain consequences shall result from the act of publication.
"Intent," when used in the latter sense, must be distinguished
from "motive."
Intent (in the latter sense) is properly used to denote the
immediate object, or consequence, or effect, aimed at by the doer
of an act; the immediate result desired by the actor.
Motive is properly used, not to signify the object or result
immediately aimed at, but to denote the reason for aiming at
that object; not to indicate the result immediately desired, but the
cause for entertaining that desire, the feeling which makes the
4
actor desire to attain that result.
Intent is frequently used, and motive is sometimes used, to
cover both the above ideas, and much confusion has resulted.
Now as to "malice":
"Defamation must be wilful in the same way as all torts of commission
must be." Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 2d Ed. 473.
' See these definitions stated and illustrated by the present writer in 20
Harvard Law Review, 256-259.
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The expression has various meanings in law, quite diverse
from each other. 5
Many eminent lawyers avoid its .use when possible, and
would be glad to have the term omitted from the law:6 , z "Malice" today, in its popular sense signifies one particular
kind of wrong motive, viz., personal ill will; but in the law of
defamation its meaning is not confined to that single motive, In
stating the law of defamation, I should substitute the expression
"wrong motive" for the term "malice."
Up to this time we have been speaking of actual wrong intent and actual wrong motive. But, before further discussing
the materiality of actual wrong intent or motive, attention must
be directed to the terms "implied intent," and "implied motive"
or "implied malice."
The ambiguous word "implied" may:in this connection mean
either one of two very different things:
Either (i) it may mean actual intent or motive (or, as it is
sometimes termed, intent or motive in fact), whose existence is
it has become a term whose varied'meanirigs can be likened to
nothing short of Joseph's coat of many colors." Mr. L. C. Krauthoff, in 21
Reports American Bar Association, 338. Sir J. F. Stephen seems to think
that the literal English equivalent of "malice" is "wickedness." (See 2
Stephen's History English Criminal Law, p. iig.) The word (or its derivatives) is sometimes used to denote morally wrong intent, or morally wrong
motive; or an act done intentionally without legal ,justification or excuse,
though without any moral fault; or merely a defendant's knowledge of a
particular fact.
• n 14 Law Quarterly Review, 132, speaking of the discussion of principles in a recent case, Sir Frederick Pollock said: "May we hope that,
so far as civil actions are concerned; it will enable us to-get rid of the perplexed and perplexing word 'malice' altogether."
In South Wales Miners' Federation v. Glamorgan Coal Co., L R. (r9o5),
A. C. 239, 255, Lord Lindley said:;". . .Ait conduces to clearness in discussing such cases as these to drop the word 'malice' altogether and to substitute for it the meaning which is really intended to be conveyed by it."
Compare Prof. Ames, 18 Hary. Law Rev. 42.
The use of the word malice is entirely avoided in the Indian Penal
Code; and (I believe) in the English Draft Criminal Code of 1879 (never
enacted).
Lord Bramwell speaks of "malice" as "that unfortunate word." L. R.
ii Appeal Cases, 253-254.
"Maliciously" is termed by Lord Macnaghten "that unhappy expression." See Allen v, Flood, L. R. (1898), App. I, p. 144.
In 21 Reports Amer. Bar' Association, p. 338, Mr. Krauthoff says:
.. . . . an expression has crept into the reports, precedents and treatises,
which has done more to confuse and obscure legal principles than perhaps
all other verbiage combined; the word 'malice' and its derivatives.
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proved by what is sometimes called "indirect evidence;" i. e.,
where the evidence, though not of the most direct nature, may
still justify a jury in finding actual intent or motive, and where
7
the jury do so find.
Or (2) it may mean intent or motive existing solely by
fiction of law; where it is said that intent or motive is "presumed," although the evidence would not justify a jury in finding that it really existed. When it is said that intent or motive
exists only "in contemplation of law," this really means that it
does not exist at all.
The second meaning, i. e., the fiction meaning, is generally
the one to be attributed to the phrases-"implied intent," "implied
motive" and "implied malice."
To return to the materiality of actual wrong motive. It is
admitted on all hands that, in an action for defamation, wrong
motive is material in two respects:
i. Wrong motive rebuts (destroys) the defence of conditional privilege.
2. Wrong motive may enhance the amount df damages recoverable."
Whether the existence of actual wrong motive, or of actual
wrong intent, is material or requisite for any other purpose in
an action of defamation, is a question considered in Jones v.
Hulton, the case about to be discussed. 9
See Henshaw, J., in Davis v. Hearst, California (i91i), II6 Pacific Rep.
530, DD 539, 540; and also pp. 544, 545.

As to whether the absence of wrong motive should have the effect of
diminishing the amount recoverable as actual damage, or whether its only
effect should be to defeat a claim for vindictive damage: see Bower. Code
of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 284-286; Odgers Libel and Slander,
5th Ed.. 398; Garrison v. Robinson, New Jersey, A. D. 1911, 79 At. Rep. 278.
'The question in Jones v. Hulton concerns the requisites of an action
for defamation, brought for a charge which is in its nature defamatory.
Very different considerations would be presented by an action brought to
recover for damage intentionally caused by a consciously false statement.
which is not of a defamatory nature. In such a suit, the defendant's mental
attitude is unquestionably material. Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., lO7,
1o8, 75, 77, 78; Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 443-5,
238; Salmond on Torts, rst Ed., p. 426, Sec. 149.
Another situation entirely different from the present, would be raised
by the following hypothetical case:
Suppose that a plaintiff, in suing a defendant who has made defamatory
statements concerning him, should allege in his declaration, as the gist o
the action, that defendant was negligent in making the statements. As t,,
what must be proved in order to sustain such a declaration, see 14 Harv.
Law Review, 199, note 1.
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The history of the law of defamation, so far as it bears on
the question- in Jones v. Hulton, may be very briefly summarized
as follows:
There was a time (very far back) when the ecclesiastical
courts were the most important tribunals which dealt with the
subject of defamation. Actions for defamation were, indeed,
brought in the inferior secular courts (such as manorial courts
and borough courts), but the higher secular courts, the king's
courts, did not entertain such suits. This jurisdiction of the
ecclesiastical courts was based on the ground that defamation
was a sin. They punished the defamer by sentencing him to do
penance pro saltte a imce. This sentence might be commuted
for a pecuniary fine; but the fine did not go to the party defamed,
nor did the court award damages to him. In order to induce
these courts to take jurisdiction to punish the sin of defamation,
it was thought necessary to allege inalitia on the part of the
defendant. And this customary allegation, whatever might have
been its original or literal meaning, came to be understood as
signifying actual wrong intent or actual wrong motive. This was
not then treated as a mere formal allegation. It was an aver-.
ment essential to be proved; though sometimes the court may
have based a finding of its existence upon an alleged prima facie
presumption of fact-that all utterers of defamation were morally blamable. 10
When at last the higher secular courts began to take jurisdiction of civil actions for defamation, the pleaders in drawing
declarations were accustomed to allege malice. There were two
special causes for the use of this averment. First.-It was
natural to copy the form of complaint hitherto used in the ecclesiastical courts. Second.-It was a natural tendency on the
part of pleaders in civil actions to borrow modes of expression
and forms of pleading from the criminal law, so far as it dealt
with the common subject of both. The higher secular courts
104 Columbia Law Review, 35, 36; I Pollock & Maitland's History of
English Law, 2d Ed., 130, Vol. 2, 536-538; Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th
Ed., 7o; Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 178, note a,
315, 316; 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 309, 319, 326; Vol. 3, 315-

317; x8 Law Quarterly Review,
6oo, 602.

268-270,

388; 6 Amer. Law Review, 597, 599,
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were dealing with libel as a crime; and it was customary to allege
malice in the criminal complaints.1 1
The courts seem at first to have been disposed to regard this
averment as a material one, and essential to be actually proved.
As time went on, however, the common law courts practically
reversed the old theories, and made a change in the substantive
law as regards the materiality of malice. But unfortunately they
did not frankly admit that they were repudiating old law and
making new law. On the contrary, they, perhaps almost unconsciously, resorted to the common expedient of concealing the
change in substantive law under the guise of establishing a mere
rule of evidence. Instead of saying that, in reality, malice was
no longer a requisite to a prima facie case of defamation, they
continued to assert that malice was still a necessary element.
But at the same time they said that it was not necessary to prove
malice, because the law would infer the existence of malice
(would presume its existence) from the speaking or writing of
the defamatory words. They in effect affirmed that there were
two kinds of malice; one, malice in fact, an actual wrong intent
or motive; the other, malice in law or implied malice, a pure
fiction, wholly non-existent.
The use of ambiguous expressions and legal fictions caused
much confusion. But gradually the following propositions were
established by a great weight of authority.
i. It is not necessary to allege in the declaration that the publication was made maliciously (unless, perhaps, when the declaration itself shows that the publication was made upon a conditionally
privileged occasion).
This was so held at an early
day, and there is no well-consid12
ered decision to the contrary.
Wrong motive or malice is no part of a prima facie case; only
an answer to a particular defence, that of conditional privilege.' 3
2. Even if the declaration alleges that the publication was made
" 1As to both reasons, see Bower, Code of the Lacy of Actionable Defamation, 273-4, and 178, note a; 2r Reports Amer. Bar Association, 342; 4
Columbia Law Review, 36; Bigelow on Torts, 7th Ed., Section 38.
'Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 272, 490; Odgers,
Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., 625.
"Odgers, Outline of the Law of Libel, 112; 4 Columbia Law Review, 37.
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maliciously, still this allegation need not be proved. Plaintiff need
not prove intent to harm. or wrong motive, on the part of the
14
defendant.
(To combine i and 2): The omission of the allegation is not
ground for a demurrer. And, if the allegation is made, a failure to
prove it does not furnish ground for a nonsuit.15
3. Even if the declaration alleges that the publication was made
maliciously; yet the defendant 16cannot exonerate himself by disproving wrong intent or motive.
4. Defendant makes a defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; which statement defendant honestly, and on reasonable grounds,
believes to be true. If the statement is, in fact, not true, defendant
is liable. No amount of previous care on his part in investigating
the facts will exonerate him. The absence of negligence on his part
17
furnishes no excuse.
5. As to the construction and effect of the defamatory statement: It is no defence that the defendant, when making a statement concerning the plaintiff, did not mean it to be understood in a
sense damaging to the plaintiff's reputation, if it was so understood
by reasonable readers or hearers.' 8
This principle is applicable to various situations, e. g.:
(5a) Defendant, though fully aware of all the relevant facts,
did not suppose that the statement would be construed in a sense
defamatory of the plaintiff, and did not intend that it should be so
understood.
If intelligent readers reasonably construe the statement in a
defamatory sense, defendant is liable.
(sb) Defendant makes a statement which he believes to be
innocent, but which is in reality defamatory of the plaintiff by
reason of facts unknown to the defendant, but known to the persons
to whom he makes it.. Defendant's ignorance of the defamatory
nature of the statement is no defence; and it seems that he is liable
irrespective of the question whether he was negligent in not ascertaining all the facts.' 9
(5c) Defendant, intending to make a harmless statement concerning the plaintiff, makes, by a slip of the pen, a statement which,
as written and published, is defamatory of the plaintiff. The fact
"Odgers, Outline of the Law of Libel, ir2-I13; Bower, Code of the
Law of Actionable Defamation, 271; 4 Columbia Law Review, 37.
1'21 Reports Amer. Bar Association, 345.
"'See Belt v. Lawes, 5T L. J. Q. B. 359.
'Odgers, Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., 181; Salmond, Torts, ist Ed., 394.
8ZOdgers, Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., iog; Hankinson v. Bilby, 2 Meeson
& Welsby, 442.
19See Salmond on Torts, ist Ed., 386; summarizing the effect of Morrison v. Ritchie, 4 Scotch Session Cases, 5th Series, 645, A. D. I9O2 (a case

more fully stated hereafter).
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that defendant did not intend to make such a statement constitutes
no defence.
6. When the plaintiff is specifically named as the person defamed, the defendant is not excused by showing that he did not
mean to name the plaintiff, and that plaintiff's name was substituted by mistake for that of20another person concerning whom the
charge would have been true.
As to the general principles underlying propositions 5 and 6,
ante, Mr. Odgers states the law as follows:
"What meaning the speaker intended to convey is immaterial
in all actions of defamation. . . . He may have had no intention
of injuring the plaintiff's reputation, but if he has in fact done so,
he must compensate the plaintiff. . . . Words cannot be construed
according to the secret intent of the speaker. . . . 'The slander and
the damage consist in the apprehension of the hearers.' . . . The
question therefore is always: How were the words understood by
those to whom they were originally published ?"21
"The law looks at the tendency and the consequences of the
publication, not at the intention of the publisher." 22

The report of Jones v. E. Hulton & Co. in both courts may
be condensed as follows:
This was an action of libel, tried before Channell, J., and a
23
special jury.
The plaintiff, Thomas Artemus Jones, is a barrister practising on the North AVales Circuit.
The alleged libel was contained in an article in the Sunday
Chronicle, a newspaper in Manchester, England, of which the
defendants were the printers, proprietors and publishers. The
"Davis v. Marxhausen. 86 Mich. 28T; Taylor v. Hearst. Io7 Cal. 262;
Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co., 6o Hun (N. Y.), 319: Hulbert v. New
Nonpareil Co., IT Iowa, 490. And see Clark v. North American Co., 203
Pa. 346 (19o2).
The contrary decision in Hanson v. Globe Newsnaper Co., 159 Mass.
20.% was made by a bare majority of the justices. The reasons given are
effectually answered in the dissenting opinion of Holmes, J., pp. 299-305.
' Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., iog.
" Odgers on Libel and Slander, .zth Ed., 341. And see Henshaw, J., in
Davis v. Hearst. Cal. 191T, 116 Pac. Rep. 530, 548.
" See Mr. Bower's strong commendation of the opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Channell in another case of defamation, where the learned judge
criticised current terminology. Bower, Code of the Law of Actionable
Defamation, 352-353.

374

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

article, which was written by the Paris correspondent of the
paper, purported to describe a motor festival at Dieppe; and was
in part as follows:
"'Whist! there is Artemus Jones with a. woman who is not
his wife, who must be, you know-the other thing!' whispers a
fair neighbor of mine excitedly into her bosom friend's ear. Really,
is it not surprising how certain of our fellow-countrymen behave
when they come abroad. Who would suppose, by his goings on,
that he was a church warden at Peckham? No one, indeed, would
assume that Jones in the atmosphere of London would take so
austere a job as the duties of a church warden. Here, in the
atmosphere of Dieppe, on the French side of the Channel, he is
the life and soul of a gay little band that haunts the Casino and
turns night .into day, besides betraying a most unholy delight in the
society. of female butterflies."
The plaintiff had in fact received the baptismal name of
Thomas only; but in his boyhood he had taken, or had been given,
the additional name of Artemus. He was confirmed in the name
of Thomas Artemus Jones. Ever since he was at school he had
been known by the name of Artemus Jones or Thomas Artemus
Jones. 24 He was known on the North Wales Circuit, and by the
25
reports of his cases in the local papers, as Mr. Artemus Jones.
He did not live at Peckham, was not a church warden, and was
not present at the Dieppe motor festival.

The defendants alleged that the name (Artemus Jones)
chosen for the purpose of the article was a fictitious one, having

no reference to the plaintiff, and selected as unlikely to be the
name of a real person. The writer of the article and the editor
of the paper testified that they knew nothing of the plaintiff, and
that the article was not intended by them to refer to him. On
the part of the plaintiff this evidence was accepted as true.26 The
counsel for the plaintiff "expressly stated that he did not, after
their evidence, allege that they or either of them were in fact
"L. R.

(1909), 2 K. B., page 451.
Page 454. The plaintiff had formerly been a contributor to defendant's
newspaper, and some of his articles had been signed "T. A. J." See page
445, 454.

' Page 446.
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actuated by malice, or intended to refer to the plaintiff in their
article."

'27

The writer admitted that he had intended to describe under
a fictitious name people whom he had seen.28 He used the name
Artemus Jones in order, as he said, to avoid the banality of using
29
A. B. or a blank.

Channell, J., refused to take the case from the jury. He
submitted the case to them under instructions which are not
stated exactly alike in the various opinions of the appellate
judges; but which appear to have been in substance as follows:
The question is not whether the writer really intended to
describe the plaintiff, but whether his article would be understood
by sensible readers to apply to the plaintiff. If sensible readers
would think that the article was a description of a mere imaginary
person, there is no action. But if reasonable readers would suppose
the article to mean some real person, and those of them who knew
of the existence of the plaintiff would think it was the plaintiff,
then the action is maintainable.30
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff with £1750
damages. Judgment was given for plaintiff. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal; making application for judgment
in favor of defendants or for a new trial.
This case, besides presenting the question whether the instructions of Channell, J., state the law correctly, also involves
the question whether, assuming the law to be as laid down by
Channell, J., there was evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find that readers might and did reasonably understand
that the article referred to the plaintiff. Upon the latter question, as w*ell as upon the former, there was a difference of
judicial opinion. Moulton, L. J., contended that there was no
evidence upon which such a finding could be based. 3 1 And the
Page

452.

= Page 455.
Page 480.
"L. R. (199o), 2 K. B., pp. 453, 458, 464, 469, 470, 482. Also L. R. (igio),
Appeal Cases, page 24.
"1Pages 468, 469, 474, 475, 477.
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same view is taken in 25Law Quarterly Review, 341. Moulton,
L. J., laid stress upon the fact that, out of the three special marks
of identification afforded by the article, two did not apply to the
plaintiff. He was not a church warden and did not reside at
Peckham. On the other hand, Lord Alverstone, C. J., said:
"No doubt any person who knew plaintiff intimately, and read
the whole of the article carefully, would come to the conclusion that
it did not refer to him, because he did not live at Peckham and was
not a church warden. But this again was for the jury, and it might
well be that the article would be read by persons who knew the
plaintiff by the name of Artemus Jones and by repute and from his
public life and position, and did not know in what part of London
he resided or whether he was or was not a church warden."3 2
Upon the whole, I am inclined to agree with the view of the
Law Times 83 :
although in the case in question other persons might
have come to a different conclusion from that arrived at by the
jury at the Manchester Assizes, at the same time one cannot say that
there was no evidence to support their findings."

Now as to the question of law: Whether the instructions
given by Channell, J., state the law correctly.
The opinion of Lord Alverstone, C. J., fully sustains the
rulings of Channell, J., upon the trial.
He said (inter alia) :
Defendant's counsel "contended that there was a distinction
between the identity of the person supposed to be referred to in
the article and the defamatory language used about that person. I
know of no case in which this distinction has been drawn, but it
seems to me, both upon authority and principle, that, both on the
question of whether the alleged libel refers to the plaintiff and as
to the meaning of the language used, the question is for the jury
upon the evidence before them."'3 4 . . . "There is abundant authority to show that it is not necessary for everyone to know to whom
the article refers; this would in many cases be an impossibility; but
'Page
.'

Vol.

455.
127,

' Page 453.

p. 96.
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if, in the opinion of a jury, a substantial number of persons who
knew the plaintiff, reading the article, would believe that it refers to
him, in my opinion, an action, assuming the language to be defamatory, can be maintained; and it makes no difference whether the
writer of the article inserted the name or description unintentionally,
by accident, or believing that no person existed corresponding with
the name or answering the description. If upon the evidence the
jury are of opinion that ordinary sensible readers, knowing the plaintiff, would be of opinion that the article referred to him, the plaintiff's
case is made out." 35
".. . that apart from the question of express malice, the intention or motive with which the words are used is immaterial, and
that, if in fact the article does refer, or would be deemed by reasonable people to refer, to the plaintiff, the action can be maintained, and proof of express malice is wholly unnecessary." 3 6
(Quoting Lord Bramwell): a "We all know that a man may be
the publisher of a libel without a particle of malice or improper
motive." . . .
Lord Alverstone further said: "What is passing in the mind
of the writer is wholly immaterial, or what was his intention if he
has in fact published a libel upon the plaintiff. ... ,,8

The opinion of Moulton, L. J., covers eighteen pages, citing
and quoting many authorities. His main position is that the allegation, found in every declaration, that the words were written and
published "of and concerning the plaintiff," is not sustained unless
it appears that the defendant "intended them to refer to the plaintiff ;"39 and that it is not enough that some people might reasonably
think that the words referred to the plaintiff. He says that liability
in defamation, so far as concerns the identity of the plaintiff, is
"dependent on intention." 40 As to the contention that a man may
accidentally libel a person of whose very existence he is unaware,
he says that "an unintentional libel in this sense is as impossible in
English law as an honest fraud."' 4 ' He treats "implied malice" as
a reality, and semble as an essential requisite to the action; saying:
"I cannot believe that the law would have implied malice on the
part of the defendant from the mere publication of the words, if
Page 454.
455.
ziApp. Cases, 253, 254.
Page 456.
Pages 464-5.
Page 475.
"Page 471.
UPage
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it contemplated that he might be innocent of any intention that they
should refer to the'42plaintiff or even-of any knowledge of the
plaintiff's existence.
Moulton, L. J., practically declares that the law of libel cannot change:
can be brought must be
"The tort for which an action of 4libel
3
the same now as it always has been."
The third judge in the Court of Appeal, Farwell, L. J.,
agrees in the final result arrived at by Lord Alverstone, C. J.
His opinion is not so clear or so consistent as either that of Lord
Alverstone or that of Moulton, L. J. But inasmuch as two of
the four judges in the House of Lords concurred in thinking
that Farwell, L. J., put the case upon its true ground, and two
of the best English legal periodicals assumed that the true ratio
decidendi is to be found in his opinion, it is desirable to state
44
with some fulness the substance of his views.
There are expressions in the opinion which, taken by themselves would seem to indorse the Alverstone view; that the question is how the statement was reasonably understood by readers,

'2 Page 466. Even if intention is requisite, it cannot always be necessary
that the defendant, when writing the article, should have had the plaintiff
personally in his mind, as a specific individual. If the defendant intentionally
makes libellous statements about the persons who manage certain companies
without naming any specific individuals, then the plaintiff, if a manager of
one of the companies, could maintain an action, although the defendant did
not know that plaintiff was connected with the company, did not have the
plaintiff in mind, and had no intention of applying the statements to him.
This was held by the High Court of Australia, overruling the Supreme Court
of New South Wales. Godhard v. Inglis & Co., Limited, 2 Commonwealth
Law Reports (1904), 78; overruling 4 State Reports, New South Wales

(1904), 327.

Page 464. This last position is in strikipg contrast with the almost
classical passage in the opinion in the defamation case of Wason v. Walter,
where Cockburn, C. J., speaks of it as an advantage of a system of unwritten law, that "its elasticity enables those who administer it to adapt it to the
varying conditions of society, and to the requirements and habits of the
age in which we live, so as to avoid the inconsistencies and injustice which
arise when the law is no longer in harmony with the wants and usages and
interests of the generation to which it is immediately applied." L. R. 4, Q.
B. 73, p. 93.
"In the following summary, propositions are not stated in the same
order as in the opinion.
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and not what was intended. But the opinion, as a whole, distinctly holds that intention, in some sense, is a requisite to the
action.
"The first step is to prove that the words published, whether
by name, nick-name, or description, are such as reasonably to lead
persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he is the person
to whom the libel refers; the next step is to prove that that is the
true intent and meaning of the words used."'45 "An action for
defamation differs from other actions, such for instance as trespass, in that it is of the essence of defamation that the plaintiff
should be aimed at or intended by the defendant." 46 . . . "The
element of intention . . . is as essential to an action of defamation

as to an action of deceit, . . 47 The learned judge says that he
differs from Moulton, L. J., "as to the meaning of the word 'intended'." 48 He himself does not mean "the intention in the writer's
mind," but "the intention expressed in the words that he has used,
as explained by the relevant surrounding circumstances. ' 49 He
says: "In my opinion the defendant intended the natural meaning of
his own words in describing the plaintiff as much as in the innuendo: the inquiry is not what did the defendant mean in his own
breast, but what did the words mean having regard to the relevant
surrounding circumstances." 5 0 He does not think that Channell,
J., in his summing up, "intended to rule anything more than that
the alleged actual, as distinguished from the expressed, intention
of the defendant was under the circumstances of this particular
case immaterial." 5'
After referring to the mode of making out
deceit in Derry v. Peek,5 2 he says: "So the intention to libel the
plaintiff may be proved not only when the defendant knows and
intends to injure the individuals, but also when he has made a statement concerning a man by a description by which the plaintiff is
recognized by his associates, if the description is made recklessly,
careless whether it hold up the plaintiff to contempt and ridicule or
not."53 He later says: "Negligence is immaterial on the question
of libel or no libel, but may be material on the question of damages.
The recklessness to which I have referred, founding myself on
Farwell, L. J., page 477.
'*Page 480.
"f Page 481.

" Page 48o.
" Page 478.
"Page 48o.
Page 482.
'L. R. I4, App. Cases, 337, P. 374.
Pages 48o-48i.
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Derry v. Peek, (L. R. i4, App. Cases, 337), is quite different from
mere negligence."54
Farwell, L. J., later says:
" . . . the libeller is not liable to the plaintiff, unless it is proved
that the libel was aimed at or intended to hit him; the manner of
proof being such as I have already stated." 55 As an application of
the foregoing views, he puts the following case: "If the libel was
true of another person and honestly aimed at and intended for him,
and not for the plaintiff, the latter has no cause of action, although
all his friends and acquaintances may fit the cap on him." "
He says that, in the present case, the writer of the libel has
"for his own purposes chosen to assert a fact of a person bearing
the very unusual name of Artemus Jones, recklessly, and caring not
whether there was57 such a person or not, or what the consequences
might be to him."
On the above ground, he concurs in dismissing the appeal.5 8

The case was then carried to the House of Lords.
In the argument there, when defendants' counsel said: "The
question is who was reant," Lord Loreburn asked: "Is it not
rather who was hit?"
Pages 482-3. The point as to which such language was used in Peek v.
Derry differed from the question arising in Jones v. Hulton.
Peek v. Derry was practically an action to recover damages for deceit.
Motive was immaterial. The only intent requisite, was intent that the statement should be acted upon, and such intent clearly appeared. The crucial
issue was as to the defendants' belief or non-belief in the truth of their
statement; whether the plaintiff had proved that defendants made the statement without an honest belief in its truth. Lord Herschell said: It is sufficient if it is shown "that a false representation has been made (i)knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it
be true or false. Although I have treated the second and third as distinct
cases, I think the third is but an instance of the second, for one who makes
a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth
of what he states." L. R. 14, App. Cases, p. 374.
But it is an entirely different question whether a man who makes a
statement, recklessly, careless whether harm follows, can be said to intend
such harm to follow. Indifference as to the happening of a consequence is
not always accompanied by intent that it should happen. It may under some
circumstances be evidence from which a jury may find intent; but it does
not furnish conclusive evidence of intent.

"Page

481.

" Page 48r; and see also pp. 479 and 48o, and middle of p. 48o.
"Page 480.
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Four Law Lords sat in the case, which is reported in L. R.
(I9IO), Appeals, 20.

Lord Chancellor Loreburn's opinion was, in part, as follows:
"Libel is a tortious act. What does the tort consist in? It
consists in using language which others knowing the circumstances
would reasonably think to be defamatory of the person complaining
of and injured by it. A person charged with libel cannot defend
himself by showing that he intended in his own heart not to defame,
or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did
both. He has none the less imputed something disgraceful and has
none the less injured the plaintiff. A man in good faith may publish a libel, believing it to be true, and it may be found by the jury
that he acted in good faith, believing it to be true, and reasonably
believing it to be true, but that in fact the statement was false. Under those circumstances he has no defence to the action, however excellent his intention. If the intention of the writer be immaterial in
considering whether the matter written is defamatory, I do not see
why it need be relevant in considering whether it is defamatory of
the plaintiff. The writing, according to the old form, must be malicious, and it must be of and concerning the plaintiff. Just as the
defendant could not excuse himself from malice by proving that he
wrote it in the most benevolent spirit, so he cannot show that the
libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff, by proving that he
never heard of the plaintiff. His intention in both respects equally is
inferred from what he did. His remedy is to abstain from defama59
tory words."

Lord Atkinson said that he concurred with the judgment
delivered by the Lord Chancellor; and further said:
". .. and I also concur substantially with the judgment delivered by Farwell, L. J., in the Court of Appeal. I think he has put
the case upon its true ground, and I should be quite willing to
adopt in the main the conclusions at which he has arrived. '' 60
Lord Gorell, after saying that he concurred in the judgment
of the Lord Chancellor, added:
' Comment on the opinion of Farwell, L. J., is postponed until after giving the history of the case in the higher court.
" Pages 23, 24. To say that his intention "is inferred from what he did,"
might be understood as implying that his intention is material. But the
learned judge had just said (and correctly) that intention was "immaterial."
Hence it was unnecessary, as well as confusing, to speak of inferring intention from acts.
" Page 25.
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"I also wish to express my concurrence with the observations
which my noble and learned friend Lord Atkinson has made, upon
the judgment of Farwell, L. J."60
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said that he concurred in the
observations made by the Lord Chancellor, but that he desired in
terms to adopt the language of Lord Alverstone, C. J., that (inter
alia) the question is "whether the person referred to in the libel
would be understood by persons who know him to refer to the
plaintiff."6 0
He put his propositions "in a threefold form."
".. In the publication of matters of a libellous character,
that is matter which would be libellous if applying to an actual
person, the responsibility is as follows: In the first place there is
responsibility for the words used being taken to signify that which
readers would reasonably understand by them; in the second place
there is responsibility also for the names used being taken to signify
those whom readers would reasonably understand by those names;
and in the third place the same principle is applicable to persons unnamed but sufficiently indicated by designation or description." 6 1
He also indorsed the statement that "the person meant" does
not signify "meant in the mind of the writer." 61
The editorial comments, published in two leading English
legal periodicals, after the decision in the House of Lords, both
assume that the true ratio decidendi is to be found in the opinion
of Farwell, L. J., in the Court of Appeal, and semble that the
gist of that opinion consists in two propositions: (i) that the
defendants are to be held on the ground that they intended to
'defame the plaintiff; and (2) that such intent may be held to
exist "if the description is made recklessly, careless whether it
hold up the plaintiff to contempt and ridicule or not."6 2
Farwell, L. J., who thinks that intent, in some sense, is a
requisite to the action, decides for the plaintiff on the ground
"Page 26.
In 25 Law Quarterly Review, 341, before the decision in the House of
Lords, it was said (inter alia), that before the decision of the majority of the
Court of Appeal, "we used to think that an action for defamation was not
an action of trespass for interference with the plaintiff's reputation, consid-
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that defendant is to be regarded as intending to defame the plaintiff. Is this ground correct?
Was there actual intent; or, if no actual intent, was there
constructive intent, intent implied by law?
It is impossible to render judgment for the plaintiff on the
ground that there was intent in fact, an actual existing intent on
the defendant's part, to defame the plaintiff.
In the first place, the plaintiff, at the trial, expressly admitted the non-existence of actual intent on the part of both the
63
writer and the editor.
In the second place, no issue as to the existence of actual
intent was submitted to, or found by, the jury. On the contrary,
Channell, J., told them that the defendant's actual intention was
immaterial. Moreover, in the present case, I do not think that
there is any evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find the
existence of actual intent to defame. Still less is there evidence
ered as a kind of property which must not be infringed by the least accidental overstepping, but an action on the case for a wilful wrong."
In 26 Law Quarterly Review, io3, it is said of the decision in the House
of Lords: "The judgments are short, and the sum of them is agreement with
Lord Justice Farwell." (This last statement must astonish Lord Shaw, to
say nothing of Lord Loreburn.) "To his judgment therefore (igog), 2 K.
B. 476, et seq., we must look if we wish to understand what the House of
Lords has decided." In a later passage, the editor, who considers the result
as "new law," says: "This may be very just law, provided we bear in mind
the qualification indicated by Farwell, L. J., (see his judgment at p. 480).
namely, that there is an element of recklessness; it is material that Z neither
knew nor cared whether there was a real X or not, and took no pains to find
out, or to make it clear that his words did not refer to any real person."
In 35 Law Magazine and Review, 5th Series, 267, the editorial comment
draws the following conclusions from the various opinions in Jones v.
Hulton: "That in cases like the present an irrefutable inference is raised
either of culpa lata or of dolus, and that thereby the conditions of the law
of tort are satisfied. This inference (presumptio juris et de jure, a fiction
against which there is no defence), was left out of consideration by Lord
Justice Moulton, and that, we must assume, was the flaw in his judgment."
It is interesting to observe that the editor adds: "But the question
arises: Was, in these circumstances of the law, the verdict of the jury at all
necessary, and, if so, was Mr. Justice Channell's summing up adequate?
Should he not have directed them to say whether in their opinion the defendant published those statements recklessly or mala fidef" As to the real
ground of the Farwell opinion, see also the comments in 58 Univ. Pa. Law
Review, 167, 168.
' Pages 446, 452.
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of such conclusive weight as to justify a judge in assuming the
existence of such intent, without submitting the question to the
jury.
It may be added that Farwell, L. J., does not appear to
decide upon the assumption that there was actual intent. 4
Was there constructive intent; intent implied by law? Is
there an arbitrary rule of law which justifies the court in holding, contrary to the actual fact, that there is in this case intent?
It may be urged that a man is presumed in law to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his act.
If there ever were such a legal presumption, it would hardly
seem proper to apply it in the present case where the plaintiff has
expressly admitted the absence of intent.
But there is a broader answer. There is no such legal rule,
no such conclusive presumption. It is, at the utmost, merely a
prima facie presumption of fact, which the law sometimes allows
a jury to act upon; "and the admission that it is an inference of
fact, and not of law, proves that its application depends on varying circumstances." 65 The so-called presumption "may be strong,
weak, or utterly inefficacious, according to the varying situations
where the attempt is made to apply it."66 "It is not universally
true that a man intends the probable consequences of his act.
. . . Probable consequences may result from acts as to which
the law, by pronouncing them to be negligent, expressly negatives intent." In many.cases, undoubtedly, the facts are such as
to justify a jury in finding intent. And, if the facts are so strong
that no other finding could reasonably be made, the judge may
be justified in assuming the existence of intent without submitting that, issue to the jury. But whenever intent is thus inferred,
"the process is one of inference from fact, not of pre-determina" As to this, see his interpretation (on page 482) of Channel!, J.'s, summing up.
"See Peters, C. J., in State v. Hersom, go Maine, 273, p. 275.
'See ii Harv. Law Review, 354, 355.
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tion by law." Or, in other words, "the process is induction from
67
fact, not deduction from arbitrary law."
(As to the statement that a person is presumed in law to intend the natural and probable results of his acts.)
"Such a form of statement, however, is useless and misleading.
So far as it is true at all, it is simply an improper way of saying
that a person is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of his" (wrongful) "acts, whether he intended them or not.
Commonly it makes no difference whether a consequence was intended or not, provided that it was natural and probable; for the
same liability exists in each case. But there are exceptional instances
(many of them in the criminal law, and some also in the law of
torts) in which the distinction becomes important-a defendant
being liable for intended consequences, but not for others. In such
cases the alleged presumption does not exist, and in all other cases
it is unnecessary."
"The only constructive intent really known to the law is in
those branches of the criminal law, in which conscious negligence
amounting to reckless disregard of consequences is imputed to the
defendant as an intention to produce these consequences; as in the
case of murder, and malicious injury to person or property. See
p. 16, n. 4, above. In other cases the probability of a consequence
may be evidence that it was intended, but there is no' 0legal
pre8
sumption to that effect, either rebuttable or conclusive.
Confusion has resulted from the tendency of judges and
text-writers to use the above alleged rule, or presumption, for
the purpose of palliating the seeming hardship of holding a defendant liable irrespective of his intent to defame. (See the
comment on Lord Loreburn, ante.) As an illustration of this
tendency, take the following passage from Mr. Odgers.6 9
"TSee 2 Wharton on Evidence, 3rd Ed., secs.

1258, 1261, 1262.

' Salmond on Torts, Ist Ed., p. 1O4, section 37, note 3.
"The 'presumption' now under consideration is apparently a paraphrase
for the statement of a very ordinary rule of substantive law to the effect
that one who does an act prohibited by law takes the .risk of all the natural
consequences of his act, and cannot, except where intent is an element of the
liability charged, escape responsibility for the consequences of his conduct
by saying that they were not embraced within the scope of his intention. So
understood, the maxim igundoubtedly correct. It suffers, however, from the
infirmity that it has no possible connection with the law of evidence in general or the subject of presumptions in particular." 2 Chamberlayne's Modern
Law of Evidence, sec. 1166.
" This learned author is selected honoris causa. If the leading authority
on defamation writes in this strain, what wonder that smaller men repeat
his language.
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"The intention or motive with which the words were employed
is, as a rule, immaterial. If the defendant has in fact injured the
plaintiff's reputation, he is liable, although he did not intend so to
do, and had no such purpose in his mind when he wrote or spoke
the words. Every man must be presumed to know and to intend
the natural and ordinary consequences of his acts, and this presumption cannot be rebutted merely by proof that. . .. " 70
Analyze the above paragraph. The first two sentences state
correctly the legal rule, which is re-stated again and again
throughout the book. Then the author adds a sentence which
a casual reader might understand as asserting that no hardship
can ever result from the rule, because it is always to be presumed
that the defendant actually intended the result.
But, as we have already seen, there is no conclusive presumption of intent. Nor is it in all cases competent for a jury to
find the actual existence of intent. In many cases they may be
justified in so finding, but there are many other cases where the
circumstances negative such a conclusion.
The only other method of sustaining the Farwell viewthat there is here intention "in law"-is to manufacture a
"hybrid" tort, composed (theoretically as it were) of both intent
and negligence; wherein conduct which was actually negligent is
treated as having also been, in legal contemplation, intentional.
Now actual negligence and actual intention are too diverse to be
treated as equivalent to each other. As between the two conceptions, conduct must ordinarily be one or the other. In the very
nature of things the same conduct cannot be both. And the difficulty cannot be evaded by resorting to the fiction of "constructive
intent."' 71
It is undoubtedly true that a defendant's so-called "reckless"
conduct may sometimes have been such as to render it possible
for a jury to find that he actually intended the damaging result.
70

Odgers on Libel and Slander, 5th Ed., page 4. Compare: Folkard on
Slander and Libel, 77.
'As to the objections to this "hybrid" tort; see Mitchell, J., in Louisville. &c., R. R. Co. v. Bryan, 107 Indiana, 5i, p. 54; Jaggard, J., in Anderson
v. Minneapolis, &c., R. Co., 103 Minnesota, 224, pp. 230, 231; Henshaw, J., in
Davis v. Hearst, California (191), .i6 Fac, Rep. 530, 543; 1 Austin on Jurisprudence, 3rd Ed., 44z
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But if the jury do not so find, then his conduct must be regarded
as negligent and not as intentional. Because reckless indifference
to probable consequences may be "morally as bad as an intention
to produce those consequences," it does not follow that the two
things ought to be called by the same name. One is negligence
72
of a highly objectionable quality. The other is intention.
Jeremiah Smith.
Cambridge, Mass.
(To be Continued.)

"The rapidly increasing use of the phrases "constructive intent" and
"intent implied by law," and the manufacture of the above mentioned "hybrid"
tort, are believed to be largely due to the unpopularity of the drastic common law rule as to the effect of a plaintiff's contributory negligence. By
that rule a negligent plaintiff whose fault is only a small part of the legal
cause, and whose conduct is less objectionable in a moral point of view than
the defendant's, is barred from recovering any part of his damages from a
negligent defendant. But if the defendant intentionally caused harm to the
plaintiff, then he cannot set up plaintiff's negligence as a bar. Hence courts
often endeavor to find something intentional in defendant's conduct, so that
a negligent plaintiff can obtain compensation; and "constructive intention"
to do harm is sometimes "imputed" to a defendant in the admitted absence
of actual intent to harm. See Aiken v. Holyoke Street R. R. Co., 184 Mass.
:269, p. 271. If the court is determined to grant relief to plaintiff, it would
seem better to frankly say that, when defendant's negligence is of a very
objectionable 4uality, he shall stand no better than if he had actually intended
harm, i. e., no better so far as concerns defending the action on the ground
of plaintiff's contributory negligence. This view might be open to serious
objection; but it seems less objectionable than the creation of intent by a
legal fiction.
It now seems not alfogether improbable that legislatures will either entirely abolish the defence of contributory negligence, or substitute a milder
doctrine for the stringent common law rule above stated. But there will
still remain some unfortunate phrases and theories, hitherto employed largely
for the purpose of mitigating the harshness of this common law rule; but
which are capable of being applied to other issues, and with very confusing
results.

